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This paper describes and analyses the current situation surrounding local finances in Catalonia, placing special emphasis 
on municipalities, in order to identify the main challenges in need of a solution today. The realities currently faced by 
city councils are, in many respects, quite different from when the main laws determining both their jurisdictional 
framework and their financing model were approved. This paper provides reflections on the role local government 
should play within the entirety of the Catalan public sector, as well as on the type of competences municipalities could 
assume, their degree of financial autonomy and the need to adhere to a certain principle of inter-municipal equality, 
while taking into account aspects such as municipalities’ jurisdictional framework and their size, and the existence of a 
large number of supra-municipal entities.
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LA HISENDA LOCAL A CATALUNYA: EVOLUCIÓ RECENT, SITUACIÓ ACTUAL I 
PRINCIPALS REPTES
Resum
En aquest treball es descriu i s’analitza la situació actual de la hisenda local a Catalunya, especialment la dels muni-
cipis, per tal d’identificar quins són, a dia d’avui, els principals reptes que caldria afrontar. La realitat a la qual han de 
fer front actualment els ajuntaments és ben diferent, en molts aspectes, de la que hi havia quan es van aprovar les prin-
cipals lleis que determinen tant el seu marc competencial com el seu model de finançament. L’escrit aporta reflexions 
sobre el paper que hauria de tenir el nivell de govern local dins del conjunt del sector públic català, sobre el tipus de 
competències que podrien assumir els municipis, sobre el seu grau d’autonomia financera i sobre la necessitat de donar 
compliment a un cert principi d’equitat intermunicipal. Tot això, tenint en compte aspectes com el marc competencial 
dels municipis, la seva mida i l’existència d’un elevat nombre d’entitats supramunicipals. 
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Introduction
Spain’s process of fiscal decentralisation, which commenced with the country’s 1978 constitution, has 
basically focused on the creation of the so-called “State of the Autonomies”. The transfer of powers has 
taken place almost exclusively in one direction: from the central government to those of Spain’s autonomous 
communities. And the efforts aimed at designing a financing model for said autonomous communities contrast 
with those focused on designing one for local governments and, more specifically, for municipal councils.
The revenue currently made available to Catalonia’s municipal councils arises from a financing model 
established by a Spain-wide law from 1988 that was amended, in part only, in 2002.1 There is, therefore, 
a certain degree of stagnation with regard to taxation at local government level. The everyday realities 
currently faced by municipalities are very different to those of thirty years ago. Today, their councils must 
provide a response to new public needs stemming from both recent social and technological changes and 
from the challenges caused by our increasingly globalised world. The issues faced by Catalonia’s towns and 
cities are difficult to tackle with tools designed at the end of the twentieth century.
So, the purpose of this paper is to describe the main features shaping the current status of Catalonia’s municipal 
finances to ascertain the main challenges faced, and hence the principal changes that need to be made.
It is divided into seven sections. Section One describes the weight of local governments within the Catalan 
local public sector as a whole. Section Two provides a brief description of the jurisdictional framework for 
municipalities, whilst Section Three describes their expenditure behaviour. The fourth and fifth sections are 
aimed at analysing two key aspects of the municipal financing model: their fiscal autonomy and the degree 
of compliance with the principle of inter-municipal equality. The sixth section covers the types of fiscal 
relations between the Government of Catalonia and local governments. Lastly, the final section provides 
some thoughts by way of conclusion.
1 The weight of the local public sector in Catalonia
One of the indicators used to measure the different levels of government making up a country is the weight 
of the public expenditure carried out by each of them. In 2014, public expenditure in Catalonia totalled 
75,740,880,000 euros, of which 14.2 % related to local governments, as shown in Graph 1.
The expenditure of the Government of Catalonia represented 39.9 % of the total. So, together, local government 
and the Government of Catalonia carry out more than half of Catalonia’s public expenditure (54.1 %). The 
remainder comes from the central Spanish administration (6.9 %) and the social security administration (38.9 
%).
1 Law 51/2002, of 27 December, amending Law 39/1988, of 28 December, governing local finances, Royal Legislative Degree 
2/2004, of 5 March, approving the recast text of the Law governing local finances.
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Graph 1. Public expenditure in Catalonia by level of government ( % of total). Actual figures for 2014
Own work based on Government of Catalonia (2017), Els resultats de la balança fiscal de Catalunya amb el sector públic central els 
anys 2013 i 2014; and Ministry of the Treasury, http://serviciostelematicosext.minhap.gob.es/SGCAL/entidadeslocales.
In the 1980s, the weight of local government in Spain as a whole hovered around the 12 % mark, and so the 
presence of local government has not changed much over the years. What’s more, the situation in Catalonia 
is no so different from Spain as a whole. There has been a significant process of decentralising public 
expenditure, but this has gone in only one direction: from the central Spanish government to the Government 
of Catalonia, which has taken over the provision of the core services of the welfare state (health, education 
and social services).
The weight of the expenditure carried out by the central Spanish administration in Catalonia is 6.9 %, whilst 
that of the social security administration reaches 38.9 %. It can therefore be said that there is a 46 %-40 %-14 
% split of public expenditure by administration level there (relating to the central Spanish government, the 
Government of Catalonia and local government, respectively).
In federal countries, this split of expenditure by levels of government is different, particularly with regard 
to the weight of local governments. Taking the average for Germany, Austria, Canada, the United States and 
Switzerland as our benchmark, these percentages stand at 51 %-30 %-19 % (León [coord.] et al., 2015).2 So, 
the weight of local governments is five points above that for those of Catalonia. On the other hand, that of 
the central government (30 %) is below that which, here, would fall to the Government of Catalonia (40 %).
2 The jurisdictional framework for municipalities
The jurisdictional framework for Spain’s municipalities is defined in Law 7/1985, of 2 April, governing the 
bases for local government: more specifically, in Articles 25, 26, 27 and 28 thereto. The content of these four 
articles can be summarised as follows:
i) Article 25 refers to the matters over which powers are exercised by municipalities under the terms 
established by central Spanish and autonomous community legislation. Point 1 states that municipalities 
2 The expenditure split by level of government for each of these individual countries, based on 2011 figures, is as follows: Germany: 
61 %-23 %-16 %; Austria: 69 %-17 %-14 %; Canada: 34 %-47 %-19 %; the USA: 48 %-25 %-27 %; Switzerland: 43 %-37 %-20 %.
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may promote all manner of activities and provide all those public services that help meet the needs 
and aspirations of their citizens. Point 2 establishes that municipalities shall exercise, in all cases, 
powers over a range of matters that it explicitly lists. Subsequently, Law 27/2013, of 27 December, 
on the rationalisation and sustainability of local administrations, established that municipalities shall 
exercise in all cases as their inherent powers, under the terms of central Spanish and autonomous 
community legislation, a series of matters. The most significant differences with those municipal 
powers established in Law 7/1985 are, firstly, the disappearance of some of these powers (for example, 
over abattoirs), participation in the administration of primary health care and social promotion and 
reintegration; secondly, a limitation on municipal social services-related powers, to assessing and 
informing on existing needs, and care in the case of emergency; and, thirdly, specification of the 
powers over upkeep, maintenance and monitoring of infant, primary and special education centres, 
thus excluding obligatory secondary education centres.
ii) Article 26 defines the compulsory nature of the services that municipalities must provide depending 
upon population levels. It establishes that municipalities must, either alone or in association, provide 
a series of services that varies according to their size. Taking into account the changes made by Law 
27/2013 to Law 7/1985, Table 1 provides a schematic outline of this Article’s content.
Table 1. Services that must be provided by municipalities, depending upon their size





Domestic supply of drinking water
Sewers
Access to population centres
Paving of public thoroughfares
Control of food and drink1
Services that must be provided by municipalities of more 
than 5,000 inhabitants





Services that must be provided by municipalities of more 
than 20,000 inhabitants
In addition to the above: 
Civil protection
Assessment and notification of situations of social need 
and immediate assistance for those in a situation or at risk 
of social exclusion2 
Fire prevention and extinction
Public sports facilities 
Services that must be provided by municipalities of more 
than 50,000 inhabitants
In addition to the above:
Urban passenger transport
Environmental protection
Own work, based on Article 26 of Law 7/1985 and Law 27/2013.
(1) Services no longer obligatory after Law 27/2013.
(2) Social services-related powers are limited in comparison with the previous Law.
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So, whether the services to be provided by municipalities are obligatory or not depends upon whether they 
have fewer than 5,000, from 5,000 to 20,000, from 20,000 to 50,000 or more than 50,000 inhabitants. The 
most significant changes introduced by Law 27/2013 with regard to this Article are those covering the 
following points:  Law 7/1985 stated that municipalities could request from their autonomous community 
dispensation from the obligation to provide the minimum services applicable to them when compliance 
therewith was impossible or very difficult. It also stipulated that autonomous communities could cooperate 
with provincial councils to guarantee provision of the services assigned to municipalities. Additionally, 
provincial councils could cooperate with district councils within the framework established by autonomous 
community legislation. However, with Law 27/2013, these points were eliminated and it was established that, 
in the case of municipalities of fewer than 20,000 habitants, the provincial council or equivalent undertaking 
coordinates, either via direct provision or though consortia, associations or other shared management 
formulas, the following services: waste collection and treatment, drinking water supply, and removal and 
treatment of wastewater, street cleaning, access to population centres, urban street paving and street lighting. 
Nevertheless, the provincial council or equivalent undertaking must charge the municipalities the effective 
cost of the service in accordance with its usage. Additionally, if these services are funded by local taxation, 
it shall be the provincial council or equivalent undertaking that shall be the recipient of the tax.
iii) Article 27 refers to the possibility of the central Spanish administration and autonomous communities 
delegating powers to municipalities.
iv) Article 28 contemplates the possibilities of municipalities carrying out complementary activities the 
purview of other public administrations, more particularly those associated with education, culture, the 
advancement of women, housing, health and environmental protection. This Article was abolished by 
Law 27/2013.
Article 84 of Catalonia’s 2006 Statute of Autonomy also introduces changes into the framework of municipal 
powers. More specifically, its content can be summarised as follows:
- It guarantees core competences specific to local governments and lists them.
- It establishes that the distribution of administrative responsibilities between different local 
administrations takes into account their management capacity and is governed by the laws approved 
by the Catalan Parliament, by the principle of subsidiarity, pursuant to the provisions of the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government, by the principle of differentiation, according to the characteristics 
of municipal realities, and by the principle of financial sufficiency.
- It provides that it is the Government of Catalonia that decides upon and establishes mechanisms for 
the funding of new services arising from any possible broadening of the scope of the powers of local 
governments.
Even this brief and schematic description of the jurisdictional framework allows us to appreciate that it is a 
complex, changing one. Firstly, it establishes differences depending upon the size of the municipality, with 
four tranches whose limits are not justified. Also, municipal services can be either obligatory (“of obligatory 
provision”, per the Law) or non-obligatory. In many cases, municipalities have ended up providing the same 
services, whether or not it is obligatory to do so (Vilalta, 2008).
3 A description of the behaviour of municipal expenditure 
The local government level in Catalonia is made up of a large number of undertakings: 947 municipalities (78 
% of which have fewer than 5,000 inhabitants), 4 provinces, 41 districts, 60 associations of municipalities, 1 
metropolitan area and 65 decentralised municipal undertakings, making a total of 1,118 local bodies. As can 
be seen from Table 2, in 2016, taken as a whole, they incurred a total expenditure of 11,212,270,000 euros, of 
which almost 81 % belonged to municipal councils. These municipal councils are, then, in quantitative terms, 
the leading bodies within Catalonia’s local public sector as a whole. This is why the analysis performed in 
Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this paper focuses on describing the behaviour of municipal expenditure rather than 
that of all the bodies comprising the local government level.
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Table 2. Expenditure of Catalonia’s local bodies. Actual figures for 2016
 €  € per inhabitant  %
Municipal councils 9,042,290,000           1,202.02 80.6 %
Provincial councils 1,141,920,000               151.80 10.2 %
Metropolitan area 580,760,000                 77.20 5.2 %
Districts 394,770,000                 52.48 3.5 %
Associations 34,110,000                    4.53 0.3 %
Undertakings of less than municipal 
scope 18,410,000                    2.45 0.2 %
Total 11,212,270,000           1,490.48 100.0 %
Own work based on data from Spanish Ministry of the Treasury.
3.1 The functional allocation of the expenditure Catalan municipal councils 
Graph 2 shows the trends in municipal expenditure from the beginning of the 1990s to date. In 1992, 
Catalonia’s municipalities as a whole spent an average of 588.71 euros per inhabitant, whilst ten years later 
the figure had reached 1,037.53 euros, a sum that continued to increase until 2009. From this latter year on, 
one can appreciate a drop-off in municipal expenditure as a result of the measures that began to be adopted 
to tackle the economic crisis that had commenced two years earlier. Although 2005 and 2006 municipalities’ 
per capita expenditure increased by 12.0 %, 2010 and 2011 saw a fall of 9.5 %. From 2014 on, a small 
recovery can be seen.
Graph 2. Total expenditure by Catalan municipalities. Actual figures, 1992-2016 (euros per inhabitant)
Own work based on Spanish Ministry of the Treasury data, INE [Spain’s National Statistics Institute] (http://www.estadief.meh.es/
publica/Indice0021.html).
Graph 3 shows the volume of expenditure per inhabitant by Catalan municipalities as a whole according 
to its allocation for three different years: 1992, 2002 and 2016. As can be seen, municipal expenditure is 
fundamentally allocated to providing the services encompassed within “community welfare” (sanitation, 
water supply and distribution, waste collection, disposal and treatment, street cleaning, cemeteries and 
funeral services, street lighting, etc.) and housing and town planning. Also noteworthy is the expenditure 
earmarked for “general services and government bodies”.
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Health, education and social services have relatively little weight within the municipal expenditure budget, 
as they do not form a core part of town halls’ activities. What’s more, in many cases, they are non-obligatory 
services: in other words, municipal councils are under no legal obligation to provide them (Vilalta, 2008).
The way in which Catalonia’s municipalities allocate their expenditure is one of the more important differences 
with the financing of those of federal countries. In those such as Germany, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the 
USA or Switzerland, education is one of the main sources of public expenditure. In Canada, for example, it 
represents 40 % of total expenditure by local bodies and, in the US, 38 %. In Germany and Switzerland, the 
figure stands at 27 %, and in Belgium and Austria, 19 % and 17 %, respectively. Such numbers stand in clear 
contrast to those of Catalonia’s municipalities, where education represents around 6 or 7 % of the expenditure 
budget. On the other hand, health has a relatively important weight only in Austria’s local bodies (at 23.5 
%). In the other aforementioned countries, health, as in Spain, falls within the powers of regional (state) 
governments. For Catalan towns and cities, health services represent between 1 and 2.5 % of their budget. For 
their part, social services represent a significant part of local expenditure in countries such as Austria, Belgium 
and Switzerland. In Catalonia, municipalities dedicate to them between 7.5 % and 9 % of their budget.
So, although the essential services of the welfare state (education, health and social services) represent around 
50 % of local expenditure in the aforementioned federal countries, the figure for Catalonia stands at some 18 
%. The greater part of the latter’s expenditure budget is allocated to “typically local” services (planning, waste 
collection, street lighting, etc.).
Graph 3. Expenditure allocation of Catalan municipalities a whole (euros per inhabitant). Actual figures for 
2016, 2002 and 1992
Own work based on data from Badespe database, Spanish Ministry of the Treasury and INE.
(*) Includes government bodies, general services, financial and tax administration and other administrations transfers.
(**) Includes sanitation, water supply and distribution, waste collection, disposal and treatment, street cleaning, cemeteries and 
funeral services and street lighting. 
(***) Includes pensions; economic benefits for employees; industry and energy; agriculture, livestock and fishing; research, 
development and innovation.
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Whilst Graph 3 provides an image of expenditure allocation that is representative of the “average” 
municipality, it should be noted that there are significant differences in certain functions, depending upon 
municipality size. There is a degree of diversity in the expenditure behaviour of Catalonia’s municipalities 
depending upon their size (Vilalta, 2018). Not taking into account population numbers when establishing the 
jurisdictional framework and municipalities’ expenditure requirements has an impact upon efficiency in the 
provision of municipal services.
4 The financial autonomy of Catalonia’s municipalities: the importance of municipal taxes
The financial autonomy of governments depends on their capacity to decide how much to spend, what to 
spend it on, and the sources of the revenue to fund this expenditure. Governments are fiscally autonomous if 
a significant part of their revenue comes from sources of taxation over which they can take decisions, both 
normative and with regard to management and administration. On the other hand, the higher the percentage 
of revenue sourced from transfers from other levels of government, the more dependent they are.
Graph 4. Revenue sources for Catalan municipalities,  % of total
Own work based on data from Badespe database and Spanish Ministry of the Treasury.
(*) Includes property income and disposals of in rem investments. 
Graph 4 shows how Catalan municipalities have four main sources of revenue, as follows:
i. Local fiscal revenue, including taxes, charges, public rates and special contributions. This is their main 
source of revenue. For the period analysed (1992-2016) this represented, on average, 55 % of total 
municipal revenue. In 2016, for example, 61 % of such revenue came from local taxes and rates paid 
directly by the public.
ii. Transfers have contributed, over the period analysed, an average of 30 % of total municipal coffers. 
More specifically, in 2016, they represented 32.7 % of total revenue (3,230,590,000 euros).
iii. Financial operations, which include financial assets (loan repayments, disposals of shares, bonds and 
other stakeholdings) and financial liabilities (chiefly debt in the form of loans). This source of revenue 
has contributed around 9 % of resources over the 1992-2016 period. In 2016, Catalonia’s municipalities 
obtained from such operations 415,850,000 euros. 
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iv. And, finally, municipal councils obtain revenue from other sources, such as property income and the 
disposal of in rem investments (principally the sale of land). Such sources have contributed around 6 
% of total municipal revenues over the 1992-2016 period. 
These figures show how the sources permitting municipal councils a certain degree of financial autonomy 
represent around 54 % of their revenue budget. This percentage is not so different from the average for 
the federal countries mentioned above. However, what is different is the makeup of the contents of the tax 
“basket”. Catalan municipalities have five taxes over which they may establish elements such as the tax rate 
(within a certain range) or certain allowances. Specifically, the taxes comprising this “basket” are the tax 
on property assets (IBI), the tax on motor vehicles (IVTM), the tax on economic activities (IAE) and two 
discretionary taxes: the tax on constructions, installations and works (ICIO) and the tax on the increase in the 
value of land of an urban nature (IIVTNU). Following the 2002 reform of local finances, municipalities of 
more than 75,000 inhabitant and district and autonomous community capitals receive a “territorialised share” 
of personal income tax, VAT and special duties (tobacco, alcohol and fossil fuels).3 
Table 3 shows, by way of example, the revenue contributed by each of these different types of taxations 
to Catalonia’s municipalities as a whole in 2016. IBI is, by far, the most important municipal tax, as it 
contributes 63.4 % of all tax revenue. In quantitative terms, it is followed by the IIVTNU, which represents 
12.7 % of all tax revenue. The weight of the other taxes collected is, in all cases, less than 10 %.
This has not always been the case over the period analysed. Prior to the 2002 reforms, IAE constituted the 
second-most important tax, behind IBI, in quantitative terms. And, during the economic boom, headed by 
that in the construction sector, ICIO had a more important place within Catalan municipalities’ tax basket: 
for example, 2006 saw it making up 13 % of tax revenue: However, three years later, in 2009, this figure fell 
ten percentage points (De Gispert and Vilalta, 2013).
Table 3. Catalan municipalities’ revenue from taxes and tax participations. Actual figures for 2016
 €M  %
Own taxes
   Property tax (IBI)     2,769.94             63.4
   Tax on economic activities (IAE)       352.27           8.1 
   Tax on mechanically powered vehicles (IVTM)         397.84               9.1 
   Tax on construction, installations and works (ICIO)         119.88               2.7 
   Capital gains tax on property transfer (IIVTNU)         554.10             12.7 
Total, own taxes    4,194.04             96.0 
Tax participations
   Personal income tax (IRPF)           94.22               2.2 
   Value-added tax (IVA)           62.21               1.4 
   Special duties           18.69               0.4 
Total, tax participations        175.12               4.0 
TOTAL     4,369.16            100.0 
Own work, based on Spanish Ministry of the Treasury data.
3 These percentages are as follows: IRPF, 1.6875 % of the tax payable in the territory; IVA, 1.7897 % of the net amount collected 
in the municipality and, in the case of special duties, 2.0454 % of the net amount collected and attributable to the municipalities for 
those on beer, wine and fermented drinks, on intermediary products, on alcohol and distilled beverages, on fossil fuels and on tobacco 
products. In the case of tourist municipalities 2.0454 % of the net amount collected and attributable to the municipality for the duty 
on fossil fuels and 2.0454 % of that on tobacco products.
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As far as local taxes, charges, public rates and special contributions are concerned, municipal councils have 
a certain margin for deciding what terms are applicable (taxable base, tax rate, tax scales, tax benefits, etc.), 
making this another way in which they can exercise their financial autonomy. These taxes are, fundamentally, 
rates such as those on sewers, street lighting and waste collection. In 2016, they contributed 1,679,150,000 euros 
to Catalonia’s municipalities as a whole; public rates, 193,170,000 and special contributions, 3,780,000 euros.
This tax “basket” is significantly different from those of the local governments of federal countries (Germany, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, the US and Switzerland). The “representative basket” of their local governments 
comprises, in addition to taxes leviable on property, those on income and consumption. For example, for the 
local governments of these countries, taxes on personal income represented, on average, 45 % of total tax 
revenue (in 2015),4 and consumption taxes contributed an average of 11 % (these are local government taxes 
in the USA, and are on retail sales). So, taxes on income and consumption represent more than half (56 %) of 
the tax revenue of these countries’ local governments. This is a basket of tax types characterised by flexible 
bases and wide collection powers. In Switzerland, for example, 82 % of local governments’ tax revenue 
comes from those on income, whilst in Germany this figure stands at 80 % (Vilalta, 2017). In Catalonia, on 
the other hand, municipalities’ tax revenue come mainly from that on property assets (IBI provides 63 %), 
whilst taxes on income and consumption represent only 4 %, and are only in the hands of municipalities of 
more than 75,000 inhabitants, and only then in the form of territorialised participation.
5 Equality between municipal governments: the role of transfers within the financing model 
for municipalities 
As noted above, around 30 % of the revenue for Catalonia’s municipalities is obtained from transfers from 
other administrations or undertakings. Graph 5 shows that it is the central Spanish administration that makes 
the majority of this kind of transfers. In 2016, 68.3 % of the total of the transfers they received came from 
this administration. Fundamentally, this is an unconditional subsidy they receive in the form of the municipal 
share of Spanish state taxes (known as the “PMTE”), for municipalities of less than 75,000 inhabitants, and 
in the form of a supplementary fund for municipalities for municipalities of more than 75,000 inhabitants 
and provincial and autonomous community capitals. The PMTE is allocated using a formula based on three 
variables: population, with a 75 % weighting corrected by coefficients increasing as it grows, and fiscal effort 
and fiscal capacity, with a 12.5 % weighting each. Calculation of the amount of the supplementary fund is 
based on application of an evolution index referring to a fixed sum associated with a base year (2003).5
Transfers from the Government of Catalonia represent 17.9 % of the total and are channelled, principally, 
through an unconditional subsidy called the Catalonia Local Cooperation Fund (Fons de Cooperació Local 
de Catalunya), and through a large number of specific grants whose allocation is predetermined by the 
Government of Catalonia itself.
4 These figures have been drawn from the following sources: Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (GFSY), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for Canada: Statistics Canada, CANSI, and, for the USA https://www.usgovernmentspending.com. It should 
be noted that, in these sources, income tax falls within the item covering “taxes on personal income, business profits and capital 
gains”. Also noteworthy is the fact that, on a local scale, this item basically comprises taxes leviable on personal income and, often, 
only those leviable on employment income. 
5 For a detailed description of the workings of this subsidy, see Vilalta (2015).
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Catalonia:     
17.9 %
From 
councils:  8.7 %
Other*:  5.1 %
* Includes: associations of municipalities, metropolitan area, districts, groupings of municipalities and smaller local undertakings, 
consortia, families and non-profit undertakings.
Own work based on Spanish Ministry of the Treasury data.
Graph 6 shows the trends in transfers received by Catalonia’s municipalities in the 2001-2016 period from 
the central Spanish administration and the Government of Catalonia, from which two important things can be 
observed: a) the increase in transfers from the former in 2009 and 2010, stemming from the implementation 
of a fund designed to offset the downturn caused by the economic crisis (the State Local Investment Fund); 
and b) the sharp drop-off in transfers from the Government of Catalonia from 2010 on.
Graph 6. Transfers received by Catalonia’s municipalities from the central Spanish administration and the 
Government of Catalonia. Actual figures, 2001-2016 (in billions of euros)
Own work based on Spanish Ministry of the Treasury data.
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Both the compared system and economics literature give a significant role to inter-governmental transfers 
within the financing model for sub-central governments. Amongst other objectives, they are designed to enable 
vertical balance and horizontal equality. In a situation of vertical balance, the spread of powers (expenditure 
requirements) and revenue is designed in such a way that every level of government has enough resources to be 
able to provide the services with which they have been charged. If, for example the local government level is 
unable to cover its expenditure requirements with its potential tax revenue, whilst exactly the opposite happens 
to a different level of government, it is advisable to enable an unconditional subsidy to correct this imbalance. 
Given the design of the financing model for municipal governments in Spain, the total revenue obtained via 
the tax basket and that sourced from the unconditional subsidy from the central Spanish administration should 
permit the covering of municipal expenditure requirements. The instrument that should have contributed to 
ensuring vertical balance is the unconditional subsidy from the central Spanish administration. However, the 
amount of this subsidy has never been calculated with this goal in mind.
For its part, there would be horizontal equality if municipal governments were able to achieve an equal or 
similar degree of provision of the services assigned to them applying the same tax burden to their citizens. 
Given that the fiscal capacity of municipalities is different (taxable bases are not spread uniformly over a 
territory), we are faced with a situation of inequality. Inter-governmental subsidies appear to be a highly 
suitable mechanism for correcting this and become a tool to achieve a very clear objective: to enforce the 
principle of inter-municipal equality. Within the current municipal financing model, the instrument that should 
enforce this principle is again the unconditional subsidy from the central Spanish administration, but this 
has not been the case (Castells et al., 2003; Vilalta, 2015). Municipalities with a greater fiscal capacity end 
up with more resources than those with a lower one. The way in which the unconditional subsidy from the 
central Spanish administration is distributed between municipalities does not help offset these differences.
6 Relations between the Government of Catalonia’s finances and those of the municipalities 
In Spain, the laws governing the jurisdictional framework and finances of local governments are approved 
by the central Spanish parliament. Powers over local matters belong to the central Spanish government. This 
is a significant difference between Spain’s decentralisation model and those of federal countries. One of the 
main defining characteristics of a federal model for fiscal relations is the recognition of the local regime as 
a state power (of the Länder, state provinces, cantons, etc.), and not a federal government one (Argullol 
and Velasco, 2011). This is an institutional difference, of the concept of the organisational structure of state 
finances, and one that ends up affecting the distribution of powers and revenues between central and state 
governments, and between the latter and local governments.
Whilst the Government of Catalonia may decide upon its territorial organisation, it has no power to decide 
upon the funding of the different undertakings that may comprise the local government level. This therefore 
represents a dysfunction in our fiscal decentralisation model.
Under a federal system of financing, the subsidies provided by the central Spanish government to Catalonia’s 
municipalities would make no sense. Under such a system, the municipalities would have barely any 
relationship with the central government. The main subsidies they would receive would come from the 
Government of Catalonia and, what’s more, as happens in the aforementioned federal countries, these 
subsidies would have a “levelling” function: in other words, they should enforce the principle of inter-
municipal equality (except in the United States, where this is not the case).
Catalonia’s 2006 Statute of Autonomy was designed to make progress on this point. Article 219 provides 
that local government revenue from shares in central Spanish taxes and unconditional subsides be received 
via the Government of Catalonia and distributed in accordance with the provisions of the Law on the Local 
Finances of Catalonia, approved by the Catalan Parliament. It establishes that, when the Government of 
Catalonia decides upon the distribution of this revenue, it respects the criteria stipulated by central Spanish 
legislation on the matter and, at the same time, said criteria must allow the Catalan Parliament to influence 
the distribution of these resources to take into account the singularity of Catalonia’s institutional system and 
bearing in mind the fiscal capacity and expenditure requirements of local governments. This gives these 
grants a “levelling out” function over local government resources and bolsters relations between the finances 
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of the Government of Catalonia and those of its local authorities. Also, this represents progress towards 
a federalisation of fiscal structures, in that it opens up the door to financing relationships that are slightly 
closer to those between state and local governments in federal countries. Nevertheless, this Article was 
declared unconstitutional by Spain’s Constitutional Court Judgement 31/2010, of 28 June, which provided 
an interpretation that made it clear that the distribution criteria set by the central Spanish government must 
be respected and thus uniform across the territory. This interpretation therefore reduces the possibility of 
progressing towards a more federal conception of relations between the finances of the Government of 
Catalonia and those of local governments.
7 Some final thoughts by way of conclusion
The above description and analysis of both the expenditure behaviour of Catalonia’s municipal governments 
and the sources of their revenue make it clear how the Catalan local public sector level is made up of a great 
many undertakings, meaning it is not easy for local citizens to identify who they are receiving their public 
services from, who ends up responsible for what they are receiving and who ends up receiving the revenue 
from the taxes they pay. This may hinder accountability and may therefore have a negative impact upon 
efficiency in the provision of local public services. Given the very small size of Catalonia’s municipalities, 
the supra-municipal level must obviously play a highly important role. When governments are small in size, 
economies of scale are lost and, what’s more, it is difficult to ensure that they are in a position to provide 
the services with which they are charged efficiently and equitably (Vilalta, 2018). Some empirical works 
(Bosch and Solé, 2005; Balaguer et al., 2007; Bel, 2012; Hortas and Salinas, 2014) have made this clear. 
These papers show that efficiency in the provision of certain municipal services improves after passing 
the threshold of a certain number of inhabitants and that efficiency in the provision of municipal services 
could be enhanced if the municipalities in question were larger. This could be achieved by either merging 
municipalities or leveraging the supra-municipal level. Catalonia already has many supra-municipal bodies 
(provincial councils, district councils, associations of municipalities, etc.), so all that needs to be done is 
to check whether they have the right size, if they all need to exist or if, on the other hand, some need to be 
abolished. At the same time, there is also a need to explore the implementation of inter-municipal cooperation 
and assistance models that would permit a reduction in municipalities’ expenditure and the more efficient 
provision of services, as is already the case, for example, with Barcelona Provincial Council’s Network of 
Local Governments (Xarxa de Governs Locals).
It would be advisable to specify the jurisdictional framework of local governments and hence their role within 
the Catalan public sector as a whole. Of the Catalonia’s total public expenditure by all levels of government, 
the local government level represents 14 %. This figure is lower than the average for local governments 
of federal countries, so what needs to be decided is whether there is a wish to approach this figure or not. 
If the answer is yes, it needs to be established which powers must be transferred from the Government 
of Catalonia to local governments. Catalan municipalities concentrate their activities in the provision of 
“typically local” services and, unlike in federal countries, they have little presence in the provision of the 
key services of the welfare state. Increasing the weight of local expenditure could be achieved, for example, 
by transferring powers over education and some local services. However, we need to take into account the 
aforementioned small size of Catalonia’s municipalities. This is why it is only after tackling the issue of 
territorial organisation and, therefore, after establishing the role of the supra-municipal level of government 
in Catalonia, that we can talk of the possible transfer of powers from the Government of Catalonia to its 
local governments, to make the latter’s role in the Catalan public sector as a whole similar to that of those of 
countries we might look to as a point of reference.
There is a need to review the municipal financing model. Figures show that Catalan municipalities have a 
certain decision-making ability over a raft of different taxes, in which the Property Asset Tax, IBI, plays the 
leading role. It is very common for property taxes to be in the hands of local governments and, in fact, this 
is the case particularly in places such as the United Kingdom and Latin countries. However, if we look at 
what happens in federal countries, it would be advisable to add to Catalan municipalities’ tax basket taxes on 
income and on consumption. In the short term, in addition to thinking of how to broaden the tax basket, we 
need to study how to improve the current one. We need, for example, to: i) bear in mind the importance of 
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the land registry (catastro/cadastre) for IBI’s proper functioning; ii) consider the role of the tax on economic 
activities, IAE, within the municipal tax basket, and, iii) take into account environmental factors in the 
configuration of the tax on motor vehicles, amongst other things. 
The data indicates that municipalities are relatively dependent upon transfers from other administrations, 
especially the central Spanish government. The way of calculating the main subsidy they receive does not 
ensure compliance with any principle of equality. In other words, it does not act as a mechanism for levelling 
out revenue, meaning that, even though there is the same fiscal effort, some municipal councils (those with a 
greater fiscal capacity) end up enjoying greater revenues than others (those with scant fiscal capacity). This 
is not the case in federal countries, where transfers are allocated taking into account some form of levelling 
criteria (except in the USA). We therefore need to take a look at how we can enforce some principle of 
equality between Catalonia’s municipalities. The compared system offers many good examples of how to do 
so (Vilalta, 2015).
In short, it can be concluded that, as far as the municipal financing model is concerned, there is a need to take 
a more in-depth look at municipalities’ fiscal autonomy (broadening and revising the current tax basket) and 
to make it compatible with the principle of inter-municipal equality (implementing a “levelling out” subsidy).6
Lastly, it would be advisable to bolster the relations between the finances of the Government of Catalonia 
and that of local governments. In federal countries, the latter have barely any fiscal relationship with the 
central federal government. This is not the case in Spain, where the laws establishing the jurisdictional 
framework and financing of local bodies are approved by the central Spanish parliament, rather than those 
of the country’s autonomous communities. This dysfunction needs to be resolved: one cannot have powers 
over territorial organisation without the ability to make decisions on the allocation of competences and on 
the financing model for local bodies. Articles 217 to 221 of Catalonia’s 2006 Statute of Autonomy represent 
a step forward in this regard. Their application would probably have bolstered fiscal relations between the 
Government of Catalonia and its local governments, if the judgement of Spain’s Constitutional Court of 27 
June 2010 had not significantly watered down their content.
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